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What’s Inside
Questions to Ask Before You Join a Club
The increased number of very large club
transactions arises from a number of
factors, including the tremendous growth
in the availability of private equity capital
and the popularity of auctions in the sales
process. Even more importantly, perhaps,
because of difficulties in the debt markets,
the percentage of equity needed to complete
transactions has increased to such a degree
that in the largest transactions even large
private equity firms cannot complete a
transaction without running afoul of the
diversification limitations in their limited
partnership (fund) agreements. (Most
buyout funds limit the amount that can be
invested in any portfolio company to 20%
or 25% of the fund’s committed capital.)
Therefore, a club deal may be the only way
to raise the required equity to finance a
very large transaction. 
Club deals offer private equity firms:
The Chance to be a Winner, Especially in 
Very Large Transactions. By participating 
in a club deal, a private equity firm may
increase its chances of acquiring an interest
in a “prized property” that it would otherwise
not have sufficient equity to obtain. In
addition, sharing judgments about valuation
and limiting the other number of compe-
titors are added benefits of being part of 
a club bid.
Diversification and Risk-sharing. Club 
transactions are also a way of spreading
investment risk by permitting firms to use
their available equity to participate in a larger
number of transactions and to spread the
risk of a single transaction among similarly
situated private equity firms.
Greater Leverage with Financing Sources.
Teaming up with another private equity
firm may well make it easier for club
members to get the best financing terms
available. Financing sources would gener-
ally find club deals attractive,
especially since they will be
able to serve more than one
client in a single transaction.
Running on the “Inside Track”
and Breaking New Ground.
Club deals might also permit 
a private equity firm to benefit
from the industry (e.g., telecom)
expertise or prior relationships
(e.g., with management or the
seller) of its co-bidders.
continued on page 14
Despite the recent flurry of large transactions in which a consortium of private equity firms have
teamed up to make joint bids and acquisitions, “club deals” themselves are not breaking news. 
In fact, they have been a staple of small- and middle-sized private equity M&A transactions for
years. Recently, however, there has been a growing trend toward large club deals with enterprise
values over $1 billion.1 Due to their size, complexity and, often, international dimension, these
transactions have generated considerable attention in the business press and have prompted much
discussion among private equity professionals and the limited partners whose money they manage.
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P r i v a t e  E q u i t y  Re p o r t
1 Notable recent examples include: the acquisition by Texas
Pacific Group, Inc. (the lead investor), Bain Capital, Inc. and
Goldman Sachs Partners, LP of Burger King Corporation from
its British parent, Diageo plc for $1.5 billion in December 2002;
the acquisition by The Carlyle Group, LP (50% equity) and
Welsh, Carson, Anderson & Stowe (50% equity) of QwestDex, 
a subsidiary of Qwest Communications International, Inc. 
for $7.05 billion in August 2002; and the acquisition by funds
managed by Providence Equity Partners Inc. (49% equity and
lead investor), Soros Private Equity Partners, LP and Goldman
Sachs of Eircom plc for $2.5 billion in June 2001.
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Ability to Penetrate Foreign Markets.
Joining a local firm in a transaction
based in a foreign market might provide
a good introduction to that market for 
a private equity firm that has not previ-
ously (or regularly) invested in that
market. Collaborating with a local private
equity firm could reduce the risk of
investing in a new geographic area.
Before participating in a joint bid or
joining a “club,” private equity investors
should understand the complications
involved – both at the bidding stage
and if the bid is ultimately successful.
Preliminary Deal Matters. Before joining 
a bidding process, each party should
consider the following issues:
• Exclusivity. What holds the bidding
group together? Will they be exclu-
sively tied to each other? Until the
auction is over, or only until a certain
date, or until they disagree on fund-
amental terms or strategy? Can they
switch partners mid-stream? Who
decides to admit a new member?
• Bidding strategy. How should the
bidding be handled? Should the indica-
tion of interest range include a stretch
price, dependent on due diligence
findings? Do the club members agree
on the highest price that they are
willing to pay?
• Role of management. What opportuni-
ties and incentives are the bidders
willing to offer to management to work
with them in the selection process?
• Negotiating control. Who will control
the bidding process? Should there be 
a “lead” investor? Should it neces-
sarily be the firm that will contribute
the most equity or that initiated the
transaction, or perhaps another club
member with a strong relationship with
management? Private equity firms tend
to operate by consensus. Should one
individual at each firm be responsible
for making decisions for that firm so
that the process works smoothly?
Relationships with advisors, including 
the investment banker (if any), the
accountants, outside counsel, etc. How
will advisors be selected? Often each
member of the group selects one of its
traditional advisors, such as account-
ants or counsel, although sometimes
“neutral advisors” are chosen so that
each member of the group has the
same degree of relationship with the
advisors. In choosing outside counsel,
we have found that the club is best
served by selecting counsel not only
with private equity M&A experience, 
but also with an understanding of the
special requirements of the private
equity funds (e.g., tax, ERISA, partner-
ship agreement investment restrictions)
and their investors, which will be
providing the equity in the transaction.
Financing structure. While determining
the amount of equity that each club
member commits to should be fairly
easy, other aspects of the financing
structure can be more problematic. 
For example, some club members may
be prepared to “bridge” some of the
purchase price from their funds, while
others may not be permitted to do 
so or may prefer other alternatives.
Determining the overall financing 
structure, including the debt sources, 
is something the club members should
carefully review. Are the co-bidders in
agreement on the degree of financing
certainty that is acceptable for their bid?
Are club members willing to pay for
commitments from financing sources,
or can they rely on historical relation-
ships to obtain the requested
commitment letters?
Allocation of expenses. If the transaction
is not successful, how will the club
members allocate the “dead deal” costs?
Allocation of any break-up fees. If the trans-
action is not successful, how will the club
members share in any break-up fees?
Participants in a joint bid also need
to have tackled a number of other issues
before submitting their bid in order to
feel confident that they will have a good
working relationship with the co-investors
if the bid is successful.
Governance Rights. Among the most
important issues to be addressed are
governance rights. The allocation of
governance rights among the club
members will be a function of, among
other factors, their relative equity stakes
in the company, their relative bargaining
positions, their expertise in the business
or some combination thereof. Matters
to be covered in allocating governance
rights among club members include:
• Board representation and committee
membership, including chair positions,
replacement procedures and adjust-
ments to board representation when
investors’ equity stakes change. Jointly
selected independent directors should
be considered to round out the Board.
If the company is going to issue public
debt, care should be taken to have
directors that will meet Sarbanes-Oxley
requirements. Investors that are 
Questions to Ask Before You Join a Club (continued)
Before participating in a
joint bid or joining a “club,”
private equity investors
should understand the
complications involved –
both at the bidding stage
and if the bid is ultimately
successful.
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private equity funds may be required to
obtain rights to board seats to satisfy
the venture capital operating company
(VCOC) exemption from the plan asset
regulations under ERISA.
• Supermajority voting rights and veto
rights. The club members should first
decide the matters, if any, that will
require a supermajority vote of the
Board. Items for consideration might
include new equity issuances, payment
of dividends or other distributions,
sales or purchases of significant assets,
extraordinary corporate transactions
such as mergers or joint ventures, CEO
hiring and firing, transactions with affil-
iates (including deal and management
fees), and exits from the investment.
Veto rights may also be appropriate in
some transaction but, particularly in 
a club with three or more members,
might tend to create logjams. In 50/50
club deals, the club members should
devise mechanisms for dealing with
deadlock, perhaps by having indepen-
dent directors on the Board.
• Anti-dilution protection: preemptive
rights, warrants and convertible stock.
In order to provide dilution protec-
tion, private equity firms typically
consider preemptive rights, convert-
ible securities and/or veto rights 
over new security issuances by the
company. In some instances, partic-
ipants will not know if they will be 
able to provide additional capital to
maintain their pro rata interests when
new equity infusions are required
because they are close to completing
the investment of a fund’s capital or
are in jeopardy of running up against
diversification limits. In those circum-
stances, the private equity firm might
want to put the investment in a 
new fund (subject to limited partner
approval) or permit its prior fund’s
limited partners to participate directly.
Because participants in a club transac-
tion may have different abilities to
provide additional capital and/or 
may require limited partner approval 
for follow-on investments, these
constraints should be analyzed when
the transaction is structured initially.
• Information and observation rights.
A minority investor that is unable to
secure board membership should
insist upon having information rights
– the right to inspect the company’s
books and records and the right to
receive financial reports and other
periodic disclosures, for example –
and/or observation rights for purposes
of satisfying VCOC requirements.
• Allocation of deal and management fees
among the club members. This issue is
close to the hearts of private equity
investors and should be resolved early
in the process. Many private equity
firms charge investing banking, origi-
nation, directors and monitoring fees
to their portfolio companies. If the
transaction is successful, which firms
may charge which fees? When? How
much? Because different investors 
will hold different percentages of the
equity post-closing (and thus affec-
tively bear different percentages of
fees charged), and because some
private equity firms share larger per-
centages of fee income than others
(and thus may be less anxious to
charge transaction fees, for example)
this can be a contentious issue.
Portfolio Company Management, Exit
Strategy, etc. Once a transaction is
completed, participants in a club deal
may face challenges because of the
nature of joint ownership. To enhance
the likelihood of a smooth working rela-
tionship, club members should discuss
operating philosophies at the outset 
of the deal. That means, for example,
sharing a common understanding of
the company’s business and growth 
plans and the appropriate strategy for
achieving such goals. Among the items
to be considered are:
• The company’s strategic plan.
• The management team. The club 
members should focus on the man-
agement team: Is it strong? Does 
it need supplementing, especially if 
the transaction is a divestituture? 
• The optimal management incentive
mechanisms. The club members
should agree on the various incen-
tivization approaches (stock purchase,
options, warrants, bonuses, etc.) 
that most closely align managers’
incentives with the club members’
financial objectives. 
• The courses of action to follow if the
company starts performing poorly. For
example, is there someone at one of
the participants’ firms who could run
the business on an interim basis if a
management change is required?
• Exit strategy. The club members should
determine whether they have roughly
similar time horizons and target rates
of return on the investment. 
Limited Partner Reaction. In deciding
whether to participate in a club deal, a
private equity firm should consider the
potential reactions of the limited part-
ners in its funds. Limited partners that
are investors in funds that jointly acquire
a business may take issue with the way
the transaction impacts them, regard-
less of the merits of the transaction.
• Anti-diversifying effect. For limited 
partners, club deals may have an anti-
diversifying effect by increasing their risk
exposure when multiple private equity
firms in which they are investors
invest in a single portfolio company.
Limited partners may find themselves
“over-invested” in a transaction in
which several of their private equity
managers have jointly participated. 
continued on page 16
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• Control investing. Some limited part-
ners expect (by agreement or
otherwise) the private equity firms in
which they invest to participate prima-
rily in control investments. If a private
equity firm engages in more than an
occasional club deal in which it is a
minority player or 50/50 investor, it
might fail to satisfy the expectations 
of its limited partners who anticipate
that it will engage mostly in control
transactions.
• Cross-ownership problems. Limited 
partners that are invested in a single
transaction through multiple private
equity firms may be subject to unan-
ticipated tax treatment in certain exit
transactions unless sponsors carefully
monitor the situation. In addition,
such cross-ownership issues may
limit exit alternatives.
• Management fees. Limited partners
may feel that private equity firms that
participate primarily in club deals
should receive a lower management
fee because such limited partners 
may view participation in club deals 
as devaluing what the “deal finders”
bring to the table. 
Put and Call Rights. If a strategic
investor is participating with private
equity firm(s) in a club deal, the parties
should consider whether to include 
put and call rights in the shareholders’
agreement. Such rights could be 
structured to enable the private equity
firm(s) to require the strategic partner
to buy out the private equity firm(s) at
an agreed upon multiple or to permit
the strategic investor to acquire a larger
stake (through exercise of a call right)
at an agreed-upon IRR. Such arrange-
ments are much less typical in club
deals solely among private equity firms.
——
Large club deals appear to be a
permanent part of the private equity
landscape. Private equity firms that
anticipate participating in such transac-
tions should do some careful planning
in order to structure those investments
in a way that avoids surprises and
conflict between both club members
and their limited partners. 
— Paul S. Bird
psbird@debevoise.com
— Franci J. Blassberg
fjblassberg@debevoise.com
— Michael P. Harrell
mpharrrell@debevoise.com
— Laura N. Beny
lnbeny@debevoise.com
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